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ABSTRACT
By tracing the development and evolvement of certain legal theories over the centuries, as well as 
consequences emanating from such developments, this paper highlights how and why a shift from 
the model of „classical formalism“ towards more deformalised models has arisen.
The paper also illustrates how deformalisation and „a corresponding loss of certainty“ could be 
harnessed  in  order  to  provide  for  greater  „realism“  and  externalities,  whilst  still  attaining  a 
respectable level of consistency. Developments and efforts aimed at exploring the applicability of 
classical formalism and deformalised models should be regarded as „an endeavour to establish a 
consistency of terms, as well as a probing into how far  principles, notions, and rules for decision 
making can be generalised, and rectification when generalisations have gone too far.“
Unity, as well as „a common law of mankind“ are goals which are still capable of being achieved 
even where fragmentation,  diversification and pluralisation of the law occur.  Such processes of 
specialisation, where correspondingly countered by the appropriate level of generality as well as the 
ability to apply rules – such that they are consistently applied in similar situations, are capable of 
achieving more equitable, just and unifying goals as opposed to a model which merely strives for 
the achievement of legal certainty. Looking beyond the borders of legal theory may indeed provide 
the much needed redress in situations where generalisations exceed the required limits.  
Key Words:  pluralism, ethics, fragmentation, formalisation, rules, legal certainty, legal 
theory, plausible constitutionalism, realism, regulation, accountability
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Introduction
In  its  aim  to  explain  how  deformalisation  and  „a  corresponding  loss  of  certainty“  could  be 
harnessed and maximised in order to provide for greater „realism“ and externalities, whilst still 
attaining  a  respectable  level  of  consistency as  well  as  level  of  legal  certainty,  this  paper  will 
commence with a  section which is  dedicated to  a   consideration and analysis  of  the model  of 
„Classical Formalism“ as well as other models founded on formalist theories. Problems encountered 
by the model of Classical Formalism, as well as a brief discussion of contrasting models will also 
be incorporated under this section.
Section two provides an analysis of the development of legal theories, as well as illustrates how the 
the move from classical formalism to deformalisation has occurred. In so doing, it incorporates a 
discussion  on  the  need  for  professional  pluralism,  fragmentation  and  deformalisation.  It  also 
elaborates on why  the Systems Theory Analysis is preferred to ethical based approaches. 
How can unity or consistency be achieved where pluralism and/or fragmentation occurs? This is a 
question which section three aims to address. Having considered all these issues and developments, 
a conclusion will then be derived. 
A. Model of Classical Formalism
Classical legal formalism is a concept which is „premised on notions of determinacy in that it aims 
to limit the role of the individual professional“ whilst  retaining an “ethical culture of inclusiveness 
and self-displacement that enables the embrace of indeterminacy, humanism, and normalizability in 
rule application.“2 Exactly what level of indeterminacy, externalities or contingencies are provided 
for, by this model of classical formalism is to be questioned. This being all the more necessary since 
its  conflicts  and  inadequacies  in  relation  to  „semantic“  and  „ontological“3 indeterminacies  are 
highlighted.
Classical  formalism could  also  be  regarded as  being  synonymous  to  other  models  founded on 
formalist theories which assert that:4 
1 School of Social Sciences and Law, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford. Email: marianneojo@hotmail.com
2 S Singh, „The Potential of International Law: Fragmentation and Ethics“ Leiden Journal of International Law, 24 
(2011), pp. 23–43 at page 41
3 See footnote 6
4  B Leiter, „LEGAL FORMALISM AND LEGAL REALISM: WHAT IS THE ISSUE?“ Legal Theory, 16 (2010), 
111–133, Cambridge University Press 2010 at page 111
− (i) the law is “rationally” determinate, that is, the class of legitimate legal reasons available 
for a judge to offer in support of his or her decision justifies one and only one outcome 
either in all cases or in some significant and contested range of cases (e.g., cases that reach 
the stage of appellate review);
− and (ii) adjudication is thus “autonomous” from other kinds of reasoning, that is, the judge 
can reach the required decision without recourse to nonlegal normative considerations of 
morality or political philosophy.
A distinction  is  made  between  two  aspects  of  the  “formalism”  which  are  assigned  by  legal 
historians to thinkers of the nineteenth century:5
− First, there was a “formalist” “theory of the nature of law (the common law, in particular),” 
according to which “in new situations judges did not make law (even when declaring new 
rules) but merely discovered and applied preexisting law.”
− Second, there was a “formalist” theory about judicial decision-making, about “how judge 
mechanically apply law (precedents and statutes) to the facts in particular cases.”
Problems Encountered by the Model of Classical Formalism
Challenges presented to such a model of classical formalism which „presupposes determinacy and a 
unifying, systemic core of reason within law“ not only include:6
− The need for the imposition of order and coherence – since, empirically, no such coherence 
exists in international law, but also the fact that;
− Such classical legal formalism constantly strives to circumvent semantic indeterminacy;
− Classic legal formalism is unable to provide explanations for the ontological indeterminacy 
of international law.“
Classical formalism or formalist theories are contrasted with realist approaches and theorists who 
attempt to provide „an unsentimental and honest account of what judges really do.“7  The ensuing 
section is aimed at highlighting how a move from the classical formalist model has occurred as well 
as the emergence of legal theories whose generation resulted in a „plurality of theories but not a 
self-conceptualization of law as law.“8
5  See ibid at page 115; see also B Tamanaha, Beyond the Formalist-Realist Divide: The Role of  Politics in Judging 
(2010).
6 See S Singh, „The Potential of International Law: Fragmentation and Ethics“ Leiden Journal of International Law, 
24 (2011), pp. 23–43 at pages 35 - 37
7  B Leiter, „LEGAL FORMALISM AND LEGAL REALISM: WHAT IS THE ISSUE?“ Legal Theory, 16 (2010), 
111–133, Cambridge University Press 2010 at page 112
8 N Luhmann, K Ziegert and F Kastner, Law as a Social System (2004) Oxford University Press at page  61
B. „Plausible Constitutionalism“9 as a Response to Deformalisation (Move Away from 
Classical Formalism) and the Development of Legal Theories
The development of legal theories which is traced back to the 12th century, whereby the occurrence 
of „the breakthrough and development of the issue of dissolving a paradox through self organization 
and  the  implementation  of  societal  autonomy“  took  place,  is  considered  to  have  resulted  in  a 
corresponding loss of certainty as well as generating a number of legal theories – and not a theory 
of law.10 Further, such evolvement as argued by Luhmann, is considered to have resulted in an 
inadequate understanding of law as a unity which produces itself – the result being „ a plurality of 
theories but not a self-conceptualization of law as law.“
In his opinion, what was of concern, was not „ a re-definition and re-articulation of characteristics 
of the rationality involved, but the question of how law could be conceptualized as a unity.“11
A change  occurred  in  the  18th century  when  the  „unifying  difference  between  ranks“  was  re 
arranged on the basis of „the concept of progress.“12  However, it  has been observed that even 
where unity, consistency and formalism appear to be progressive, they might generate regressive 
results.13
This constitutes a reason, amongst others for the need to explore beyond the borders of classical 
formalism and incorporate ethical based approaches. Ethics and moralism are associated with the 
culture  of  formalism  –  however  this  should  not  imply  that  deformalisation  is  incapable  of 
generating ethical and moral based outcomes.
Need for Professional Pluralism, Fragmentation and Deformalisation and the Preference for 
the Systems Theory Analysis
Pluralism and fragmentation are concepts which can be distinguished from each other given the fact 
that whilst fragmentation is more synonymous to a process of diversification, pluralism represents 
the inherent nature and potential for a rule to become specialised. In order words, a rule may be 
9 This concept comprises „both positivist and ethical elements – from the perspective of  International Law, it is 
positivist in its statement and description of International Law as a system, and ethical since it includes a project of 
resistance to the current state of affairs.“ See S Singh, „The Potential of International Law: Fragmentation and 
Ethics“ Leiden Journal of International Law, 24 (2011) at page 38.
10  See N Luhmann, K Ziegert and F Kastner, Law as a Social System (2004)Oxford University Press at pages 61 and 
62
11 „In response to such an issue, the apparatus of systems theory was to be applied in order to analyse what it means to 
define the unity of law as a system. Possibly, the most influential or certainly the most respected approach to a 
construction of the unity of law used a hierarchy of sources of law or legal types: an approach which relied on a 
stratified  social  system  and  which  postulated  the  necessity  for  such  a  hierarchical  order  dogmatically  –  thus 
obscuring the paradox of unity from multitude.“ See ibid at page 62
12 „This being done in the belief that the tradition order had broken down, with increasing secularization and historical 
conception of descriptions of structure.“ see ibid at page 63
13 See for example,  S Singh, „The Potential of International Law: Fragmentation and Ethics“ Leiden Journal of 
International Law, 24 (2011), at page 35; J A Beckett, „Rebel Without a Cause? Martti Koskenniemi and the Critical 
Legal Project“ (2006) 7 GLJ 1045, at 1072
capable of being specialised in certain contexts – however the question relates to when and at what 
point such rule becomes an exception (or should become specialised) in a specific situation. Where 
such a position has been ascertained or when such a question can be responded to, it is most likely 
and evident  that  the  process  of  fragmentation  will  occur.  Consequently,  it  is  also  likely that  a 
process of deformalisation will follow.
Hence Pluralism, Fragmentation and Deformalisation are linked in the sense that they are elements 
of a rule which constitute a process and which can be distinguished in the order in which they occur 
in such a  process. Such a process can be illustrated as follows:
Rule/Law's inherent characteristics --->  Occurrence of Fragmentation ----> Deformalisation of rule
(Pluralistic nature of rule)
  
As well as constituting a term which is „commonly used to refer to the slicing up of international 
law into regional or functional regimes that cater for special audiences  with special interests and 
special ethos’, fragmentation is also referred to as the so-called primitive character of international 
law (‘international law is still fragmented’).14
The language of fragmentation, according to Martineau, is considered to be a powerful metaphor 
since it  „articulates the play between diversity and unity in a specific way.“15 Even though the 
fragmentation of law has generated concerns, it will be highlighted in the subsequent section that it 
could also serve as a means whereby unity could be achieved. Furthermore, it has been asserted that 
legal theory is moving beyond16 the realm of philosophy and that theoreticians should also explore 
the intellectual resources of other legal traditions in their efforts to found a global legal order.17
Hence the benefits of diversification and pluralism are recognised – such benefits being capable of 
maximisation, as well as the prevention of a situation where deformalisation contributes to greater 
chaos, dis-unity and „an inadequate understanding of law as a unity which produces itself.“
The role of ethics and morals in maximising the benefits of diversification and pluralism are thus 
introduced.  From this  perspective,  whilst  there is need for professional pluralism, there is even 
greater need for the development of professional pluralism. An incorporation of the roles of ethics 
and morals serves as a means whereby such a development of professional pluralism can occur.
Whilst the value of ethics is lauded on the one hand by Singh, who states that Weber’s warning of 
the prison bars of bureaucratization, the legacy of Foucault, and the works of Koskenniemi require 
international lawyers to embrace a considered ethical responsibility and disengage themselves from 
the language of their expertise and the obfuscated drama of governance,18 the importance of legal 
14  „Both  meanings  being  extensively  conveyed  by  international  lawyers.  „  See  A Martineau,  The  Rhetoric  Of 
Fragmentation: Fear and Faith in International Law, The Structure of the Fragmentation Debate: The Play Between 
Unity and Diversity Leiden Journal of International Law  /  Volume 22   Issue 01, pp 1 – 28 Published online: 04 
Februar 2009 at page 4
15 See ibid at page 5
16  „The acknowledgement that a plurality of rational, but incompatible, positions exists in the context of any legal 
dispute justifies a comprehensive enquiry into the practicalities of achieving global justice. This does not undermine 
the importance of theory but it does move us beyond the realm of philosophy.“ See S Allen,  (Book Review by 
Stephen  Allen,  Patrick  Capps),  „Human  Dignity  and  the  Foundations  of International  Law,  Leiden  Journal  of 
International Law (2010), 23: 960-966  at page 966
17  Ibid at page 961
18 He adds that „At the moment of decision, every legal professional has the capability to embrace an freedom. At this 
moment of decision, of discretion, the legal professional is able to embrace law as Koskenniemi intended for Kant’s 
certainty is also highlighted by Luhmann whose preference for the systems theory analysis (as a 
means of addressing a situation where the question of determining the position of law in modern 
society arises) is illustrated thus:19
Systems theory analysis is the only candidate for the task of assisting where the question of determining the 
position of law in modern society arises and where it is necessary to account for changes that are beginning to 
reveal themselves. Such solution capable of being provided by systems theory would not be possible by a  
return to a natural law of the Aristotelian or post Aristotelian kind (legal rationalism) nor by trying to use  
various „ethics“ approches that lack conceptual clarity, nor by resorting to the economic analysis of law –  
which provides too little information about the society to which it is supposed to apply.
Such „ethics analyses“ or „ethics commissions“ as further argued by Luhmann, serve the political 
preparation of agreed foundations for legal regulation and owe to the law, their confidence that 
everything could be changed if new information came to hand or the situation were to be assessed 
differently in the future.
C. How Can Unity or Consistency be Achieved where Pluralism and/or Fragmentation 
Occurs?
In order to respond to this question, reference has to be made to the concluding part of the previous 
section.
There is greater need for the development of professional pluralism – as opposed to the mere need 
for pluralism. An incorporation of the roles of ethics and morals serves as a means whereby such a 
development of professional pluralism can occur. However, the incorporation of ethics and morals, 
as well as the process of deformalisation which consequently occurs or which may have occurred as 
a result of pluralism and fragmentation, will most likely contribute to less consistency and reduced 
legal certainty.  As highlighted in the final  part  of the previous section,  the lack of „conceptual 
clarity“  attributed  to  the  application  of  ethical  approaches,  is  considered  to  be  a  reason  for  a 
preference of a systems theory analysis. This is not to imply that ethical approaches are not to be 
desired – their ability to incorporate and provide for externalities as well as contingencies may give 
them an edge over the systems theory analysis. 
The systems theory analysis is hence, a means whereby unity or consistency could be achieved – 
where pluralism and/or fragmentation occur.
Unity could also be achieved through Balanced Realism, a concept which is defined as follows:20
Judges sometimes make choices,  that they can manipulate legal  rules and precedents, and that they sometimes are 
influenced by their political and moral views and their personal biases (the skeptical aspect [of balanced realism].
Yet [balanced realism] conditions this skeptical awareness with the understanding that legal rules nonetheless work; that 
judges abide by and apply the law; that there are practice-related, social, and institutional factor that constrain judges; 
and that judges render generally predictable decisions consistent with the law (the rule-bound aspect).
‘moral politician’. But, more importantly, the professional is also able to revolt against the linguistic barriers of his 
technicality: to view a plurality of perspectives.“ S Singh, „The Potential of International Law: Fragmentation and 
Ethics“ Leiden Journal of International Law, 24 (2011), at page 43; See M Foucault, ‘Iran: The Spirit of a World 
without Spirit’,  in L.  Kritzman (ed.),  Michel  Foucault:  Politics,  Philosophy,  Culture (1988),  at 214 and also M 
Weber, FromMaxWeber: Essays in Sociology (trans. H. H. Gerth and C.Wright Mills) (1946), 357.
19  N Luhmann, K Ziegert and F Kastner, Law as a Social System (2004)Oxford University Press at page 66
20  See B Leiter, „LEGAL FORMALISM AND LEGAL REALISM: WHAT IS THE ISSUE?“ Legal Theory, 16 
(2010), 111–133, Cambridge University Press 2010 at page 123
Fragmentation  and  pluralism,  whilst  having  the  potential  to  generate  concerns,  could  serve  as 
instruments which could be implemented „for the common law of mankind“21 as well as a means of 
establishing a global legal order.22
Such  dynamism  in  international  law,  which  serves  as  justification  for  the  implementation  of 
pluralism  in  the  establishment  of  unifying  goals  is  not  only  peculiar  to  international  law. 
Developments and evolvements of classical  formalism, as well  as socio economic and dynamic 
changes which have taken place in late modern societies23, across social, economic and regulatory 
spheres,  re-iterate  the  need  for  the  development  of  professional  pluralism  as  well  as  „the 
understanding that professional existentialism is a transpiring mindset of noble objectives.“24
 CONCLUSION
As illustrated by the model of classical  formalism, ethics and moralism are associated with the 
culture of formalism. However this should not imply that deformalisation is incapable of generating 
ethical and moral based outcomes. In fact a certain paradox exists – given the fact that ethical based 
approaches are also considered  to generate less certainty and less consistency.
The  crucial  issue  entails  achieving  the  right  balance  between  generalizations  and  the  level  of 
discretion which is required to incorporate approaches which are tailored individually to situations – 
whilst striving to achieve and „establish a consistency of terms, a probing into how far principles, 
notions, and rules for decision making can be generalised, and correction when generalizations have 
gone too far.“25
Furthermore, legal specialists may also be required as a means of introducing greater accountability 
into the judicial process. This is of immense significance in areas such as regulation. Whilst the 
level  of  legal  certainty  attributed  to  such  diversification  of  the  law  may  be  reduced,  a  legal 
professional with moral and ethical values, who is able to apply rules and principles in such a way 
as to achieve the right balance between formalism (generalization) and pluralism whilst striving for 
a high level of consistency and legal certainty, will certainly have greater potential to achieve more 
equitable and just legal outcomes.  
21 A Martineau, The Rhetoric Of Fragmentation: FEAR AND FAITH IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE 
STRUCTURE OF THE FRAGMENTATION DEBATE: THE PLAY BETWEEN UNITY AND DIVERSITY Leiden 
Journal of International Law / Volume 22  Issue 01, pp 1 – 28 Published online: 04 Februar 2009 at page 20 and see 
also  C.W. Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind (1958)
22  S Allen,  Human Dignity and the Foundations of International Law, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009 at page 966
23 See Beck's „Risk Society Theory“.  The “risk society” approach is one that identifies broad socioeconomic and 
political changes which occurred in late modern societies. See Beck U, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity 
(1992) London: Sage Publications
24  S Singh, „The Potential of International Law: Fragmentation and Ethics“ Leiden Journal of International Law, 24 
(2011), pp. 23–43 at page 1
25 „.....when  generalizations  have  gone  too  far,  especially  when  applying  the  operating  scheme  of  rules  and 
exceptions.“  N Luhmann, K Ziegert and F Kastner, Law as a Social System (2004)Oxford University Press at page 
55. For further reading on legal certainty and the role of courts and legislative bodies in the facilitation of a high 
degree of legal certainty, see M Ojo, „Addressing the Inadequacies of Private Law in the Regulation of Contracts 
(During and Post Contract Formation Periods) July 2011.
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